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ENFORCING THE EXISTING AGREEMENT AFTER THE
NLRB WAIVES THE CONTRACT-BAR RULE
When a union and an employer execute a valid collective bargain-
ing agreement, they can usually expect it to remain in place, unchal-
lenged, for at least three years. Their expectation rests on the National
Labor Relations Board's "contract-bar rule," which prevents the elec-
tion of any other union within a reasonable period of time after the
execution of a contract,1 a period generally limited to three years.2 The
contract-bar rule represents an attempt to ensure industrial stability
while safeguarding workers' freedom in choosing their bargaining rep-
resentative.' When enforcement of the rule would not promote stability,
the Board has declined to apply it. Thus, a number of exceptions to the
rule have developed,4 and a major new exception has recently been ap-
proved by the Ninth Circuit.5
When the Board finds that one of the exceptions to the contract-
bar rule applies and allows a union election, another Board-made rule
takes effect: the new union, if successful in the election, is not bound by
the existing contract.' This rule, which elevates considerations of em-
ployee free choice over those of industrial stability, warrants reexami-
nation in light of the recent expansion in exceptions to the contract-bar
rule.7 This Comment argues that when the Board declines to apply the
contract-bar rule because of a defect in the administration of the con-
tract, rather than because of a flaw in the contract itself, the new union
should be required to assume the existing contract.
Part I of the Comment details the purpose and application of the
contract-bar rule. Part II examines and criticizes the Board's practice
of allowing a union that has been certified under an exception to the
contract-bar rule to negotiate a new contract. The Comment concludes
See National Sugar Ref. Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 1410, 1415 (1939).
s See General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125 (1962).
s See infra text accompanying notes 11-16.
4 See infra text accompanying notes 17-34.
See NLRB v. Circle A & W Prods. Co., 647 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
600 (1981) (union's disclaimer of representation in response to employee deauthorization vote
justifies exception to contract-bar rule); see also American Sunroof Corp.-W. Coast, Inc., 243
N.L.R.B. 1128 (1979).
" See American Seating Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 250, 255 (1953). See generally Freidin, The
Board, the "Bar," and the Bargain, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 61, 82-92 (1959). The new union can,
however, and often does, assume the contract voluntarily. See Summers, Union Schism in Perspec-
tive: Flexibile Doctrines, Double Standards, and Projected Answers, 45 VA. L. REV. 261, 278 &
n.78 (1959).
' See supra note 5; infra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
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that in most such instances, considerations of industrial stability should
impel the Board and the courts to require that the existing contract
remain in effect.8
I. THE CONTRACT-BAR RULE
A. Prerequisites and Exceptions
First announced in 1939,1 the contract-bar rule provides that
when a valid contract between a certified bargaining agent and an em-
ployer has been executed, the Board normally refuses to allow the elec-
tion of any other union for a reasonable period of time.10 The Board
developed the rule to balance the two competing interests underlying
the National Labor Relations Act: employee freedom to choose a rep-
resentative, and industrial stability. 2
In particular, the Board has balanced employees' freedom to reap-
praise and change union representation at reasonable intervals"3 against
the belief that a valid collective bargaining contract is "both means and
proof of the achievement of that stability which is an objective of the
statute."14 The result is a rule under which "postponement of the em-
S This Comment does not argue against the present exceptions to the contract-bar rule, focus-
ing instead on the treatment of the existing contract once an exception to the rule has been made.
' National Sugar Ref. Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1939); see also Appalachian Shale Prods. Co.,
121. N.L.R.B. 1160, 1161 (1958).
10 National Sugar Ref. Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 1410, 1415 (1939). A reasonable period of time is
now considered to be any term up to three years. General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125
(1962); see also Bob's Big Boy Family Restaurants v. NLRB, 625 F.2d 850, 851 (9th Cir. 1980).
Under Board rule, "a 60-day period immediately preceding the expiration date of an existing
contract is established during which the parties may negotiate and execute a new or amended
agreement without the intrusion of a rival petition. A petition filed during the 60-day insulated
period is subject to dismissal as untimely, regardless of any conduct of the parties during that 60-
day period." Appalachian Shale Prods. Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1160, 1164 (1958) (footnote omitted);
see also Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 995, 1000-01 (1958).
21 It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their
employment or other mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
Is The courts and the Board explicitly recognize these as the interests underlying the Act.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Circle A & W Prod. Co., 647 F.2d 924, 926 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
600 (1981); American Sunroof Corp.-W. Coast, Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 1128, 1130 (1979) (Penello,
dissenting); East Mfg. Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. 5, 6 (1979).
is American Seating Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 250, 255 & n.16 (1953).
" Container Corp. of Am., 61 N.L.R.B. 823, 826 (1945). Such a contract is stabilizing be-
cause, "[in defining the employment conditions for the term of the contract, the agreement reflects
not only the successful operation of the collective-bargaining process, but also the substantial in-
vestments which the parties have made to their bargaining relationship." American Sunroof
Corp.-W. Coast, Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 1128, 1130 (1979) (Penello, dissenting). See generally R.
GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 54-59 (1976).
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ployees' right to select or change their representative is justified for a
reasonable period of time by the paramount interest of contractual sta-
bility."1" The employees' interest in free choice is acknowledged by
"the opportunity, at reasonable and predictable intervals, to reappraise
and, if they so desire, change their representative."'
In certain instances, however, the Board has determined that "the
paramount interest of contractual stability"17 would not be served by
enforcement of the rule and has therefore permitted an election to take
place within the contract-bar period." These instances can be divided
into two categories: those in which instability would be caused by de-
fects in the contract itself, and those in which instability would be
caused by ineffective union administration of'an otherwise valid con-
tract. The first category can be labeled "prerequisites" to the operation
of the rule, and the second "exceptions" to its enforcement.
Generally, for a contract to be treated as a bar, it is a prerequisite
that it be "adequate."' 9 Thus, the agreement must be in writing and
must have been signed by all the contracting parties before the filing of
the petition against which it is urged as a bar; 0 it must encompass
substantial terms and conditions of employment; 1 the contract must ap-
ply to the employees sought in the rival union's petition;22 and it must
"embrace" an appropriate unit." Finally, the contract must be for a
fixed term.24




IS See, e.g., Hershey Chocolate Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 901, 906-09 (1958); Container Corp. of
Am., 121 N.L.R.B. 823, 826 (1945).
19 Appalachian Shale Prods. Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1160, 1161-62 (1958) (Board rules that con-
tract must be signed prior to filing of petition to be effective bar). See generally Freidin, supra
note 6, at 74-77.
20 Appalachian Shale Prods. Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1160, 1161-62 (1958). Also, "[w]here ratifi-
cation is a condition precedent to contractural [sic] validity by express contractural [sic] provision
the contract will be ineffectual as a bar unless it is ratified prior to the filing of a petition, but if
the contract itself contains no express provision for prior ratification, prior ratification will not be
required as a condition precedent for the contract to constitute a bar." Id. at 1163 (footnote
omitted).
21 Id. (citing Bethlehem Steel Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 1508 (1951)). A contract limited to wages
only, for example, would not constitute a bar.
" Id. at 1164.
23 Id.
24 Cind-R-Lite Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 1255, 1256 (1979); Pacific Coast Ass'n of Pulp and Paper
Mfrs., 121 N.L.R.B. 990, 992-93 (1958).
The Board has also held that a contract that discriminates racially among employees will not
bar an election, see Pioneer Bus Co., Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 54, 55 (1962), nor will a collective
bargaining agreement containing a "clearly unlawful" union-security provision, Paragon Prods.
Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. 662, 666 (1961). However, an agreement with a "hot cargo" clause that is
illegal under § 8(e) of the Act will bar an election. Food Haulers, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 394 (1962).
Contracts with "ambiguous though not clearly unlawful union security provisions will bar repre-
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The Board has found exceptions to the contract-bar rule when
changes in the structure of the union or the bargaining unit threaten
industrial stability. When, for example, a union is determined to be
"defunct" 5 or involved in a "schism,"'26 the existing contract is no
longer considered a stabilizing force and will not bar the election and
certification of a new union.
A union is said to be "defunct" if it is "unable or unwilling to
represent the employees" in the bargaining unit.17 Such inability or un-
willingness may be evidenced by the union's failure to conduct meet-
ings, process grievances, administer the contract, or elect officers." A
"schism" occurs when a local union votes in an open meeting to disaf-
filiate from the parent international union because of some "basic intra-
union conflict,"2 9 that is, "any conflict over policy at the highest level of
an international union . . . which results in a disruption of existing
intraunion relationships.""0 The employer is thereby "confronted with
two organizations each claiming with some show of right to be the or-
ganization previously chosen by the employees as their representa-
tive,""1 and industrial stability clearly is not served by barring an elec-
tion that would settle the confusion as to the employees' bargaining
agent.32
A third exception to the contract-bar rule applies when a bargain-
ing unit has expanded substantially." Substantial expansion, for these
sentation proceedings in the absence of a determination of illegality as to the particular provision
involved by the Board or a Federal court pursuant to an unfair labor practice proceeding." Para-
gon, 134 N.L.R.B. at 667.
25 See, e.g., Container Corp. of Am., 61 N.L.R.B. 823 (1945).
See, e.g., Hershey Chocolate Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 901 (1958) (schism must be in context
of an intraunion conflict).
Hershey Chocolate Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 901, 911 (1958); see also Container Corp. of
Am., 61 N.L.R.B. 823, 827 (1945) (relevant facts included small number of meetings held, lack of
attendance at those meetings, the failure to insist that new employees join the union, and the
failure to replace shop stewards who did not collect union dues). "Defunctness" considerations go
only to the party signatory to the contract. Thus, if a local union signatory to the contract is
defunct, actions of the international will not be considered. Hershey Chocolate, 121 N.L.R.B. at
911-12.
" R. GORMAN, supra note 14, at 57; see, e.g., Container Corp. of Am., 61 N.L.R.B. 823,
827 & n.9 (1945). On the other hand, neither temporary inability to function, nor loss of all
members in the unit necessarily renders the union defunct. See Hershey Chocolate Corp., 121
N.L.R.B. 901, 911 (1958).
" Hershey Chocolate Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 901, 911 (1958). Mere changes in affiliation by
local unions are thus excluded from this exception. Id. at 910-11. See generally Summers, supra
note 6.
" Hershey Chocolate Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 901, 907 (1958).
31 Id. at 909.
33 Id.
" See, e.g., General Extrusion Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1165 (1958). The rule announced in Gen-
eral Extrusion is that the contract is not a bar when the change is in "the nature as distinguished
from the size of the operations." Further, "a mere relocation of operations accompanied by a
transfer of a considerable proportion of the empoyees to another plant, without an accompanying
CONTRACT-BAR RULE
purposes, occurs when less than thirty percent of the current employees
were employed, or less than fifty percent of the currrent job classifica-
tions existed, at the time the contract was executed." As with schism
and defunctness, the expansion of the bargaining unit may render the
union unable to adequately administer the contract. Unlike the two
other exceptions, however, the expanded bargaining unit may also im-
plicate the terms of the contract itself, which may be unsuited to the
larger unit.
When the Board suspends the contract-bar rule-whether because
a prerequisite is lacking or because an exception applies-the successor
union is not considered bound by the existing contract. An employer's
refusal to bargain over a new contract is a violation of section 8(a)(5) of
the Act, 5 and the union presumably has the right to strike in support
of such bargaining.36 The Board formulated this policy in a 1953 case,
American Seating Co.,37 which has been sustained by later Board deci-
sions.3 ' The Board's reasoning in American Seating rested on a belief
that the contract-bar rule was designed to keep "[b]argaining represent-
change in the character of the jobs and the functions of the employees in the contract unit, does not
remove a contract as a bar." Id. at 1167-68 (footnote omitted).
3 Id. at 1167.
35 See, e.g., NLRB v. Circle A & W Prods. Co., 647 F.2d 924, 925 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 600 (1981). Section 8(a)(5) states: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions
of section [9(a)]." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
" See Freidin, supra note 6, at 64, 91; see also NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 290-91
(1957) (it would be "anomalous" to recognize duty to bargain while depriving union of strike
threat).
37 106 N.L.R.B. 250, 255 (1953). The Board had tried various other formulations prior to
announcing its current rule. Before the contract-bar rule was formulated, the Board did allow
employees to change representatives, but required the new union to assume the existing
agreement:
[A] change in representation does not alter or cancel any existing agreement made
on behalf of the employees by [their] . . . previous representatives. The only effect
of a certification by the Board is that the employees have chosen other agents to
represent them in dealing with the management under the existing agreement.
New England Transp. Co., I N.L.R.B. 130 (1936) (quoting 1935 NAT'L MEDIATION BOARD
ANN. REP. 23-24). Once the Board established the contract-bar rule, it initially enforced the ex-
isting contract when it allowed an election under an exception to the rule. See Register and Trib-
une Co., 60 N.L.R.B. 360 (1945); Harbison-Walker Refractories Co., 43 N.L.R.B. 1349 (1942).
After the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), however, the Board
declared that it would not decide the effect of an intervening certification on an existing agreement:
With regard to the duty of the Employer and the representative of its employees to
bargain now or in the future upon the basis of the current contract or for a new
contract, we do not believe it to be this Board's function, in a representation pro-
ceeding, to pass upon this issue.
Boston Mach. Works Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 59, 61 (1950). This stance lasted only until American
Seating was decided three years later.
" See, e.g., Consolidated Fiberglass Prods. Co., Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 10 (1979); General Dy-
namics Corp., 184 N.L.R.B. 553 (1970); Hershey Chocolate Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 901 (1958);
Ludlow Typograph Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 724 (1955).
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atives . . responsive to the needs and desires of their constituents," 9
and,
if a newly chosen representative is to be hobbled [by a con-
tract it did not negotiate], a great part of the benefit to be
derived from the no-bar rule will be dissipated. There is lit-
tle point in selecting a new bargaining representative which
is unable to negotiate new terms and conditions of employ-
ment for an extended period of time. °
Thus, in creating the American Seating corollary to the contract-
bar rule, the Board implicitly balanced the two competing policy con-
cerns underlying the Act: employee free choice, and industrial stabil-
ity.41 In allowing the successor union a free hand in negotiating a new
contract, the Board in effect gave more weight to free choice than to
stability.
B. The Recent Expansion in Exceptions
to the Contract-Bar Rule
The Board, with at least some court approval,"2 has recently rec-
ognized a new exception to the contract-bar rule, one that applies when
a union disclaims its interest in representing a bargaining unit. Like
the exceptions for union schism and defunctness, this new exception is
justified by a defect in the administration of the contract, not in its
terms.'8
In a 1979 case, American Sunroof Corp.-West Coast, Inc.,44 em-
ployees filed a deauthorization petition under section 9(e)(1) 4 5 of the
NLRA, attempting to withdraw the union-shop provision' of the col-
lective bargaining agreement. 47 In apparent retaliation, the union dis-
claimed and waived all interest in representing the employees.' 8 The
Board, reviewing an election petition for certification of a rival union,
S American Seating, 106 N.L.R.B. at 255.
4o Id.
41 See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
4' See NLRB v. Circle A & W Prods. Co., 647 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
600 (1981).
4' See supra text accompanying notes 25-32.
" 243 N.L.R.B. 1128 (1979).
45 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(1) (1976).
4' A union-shop provision requires a worker to join the union as a condition of employment.
R. GORMAN, supra note 14, at 44.
47 243 N.L.R.B. at 1128. Under § 9(e)(1) of the Act, when employees wish to terminate the
authority of their bargaining representative to enter into a union-shop or maintenance-of-member-
ship agreement, they may petition for an election on that issue. A majority of eligible voters is
required for deauthorization. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(1) (1976).
" 243 N.L.R.B. at 1128.
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held that the disclaimer removed the contract as a bar to a new
election."
The Board went on to hold, citing American Seating,50 that the
successor union, if successful in the election, would not be bound by the
existing contract:
It is well settled. . . that when a union is decertified, or
when an employer transfers its business to a successor em-
ployer, the succeeding union or employer is not bound by a
prior contract, even if the terms of the contract have not yet
expired. The same principle applies when an existing con-
tract is held not to bar an election, and a new union becomes
the representative of the employees previously covered by the
contract.5 1
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Board's approach in a recent case
involving substantially the same facts as American Sunroof. In NLRB
v. Circle A & W Products Co.,52 a union, in response to two successive
employee votes to withdraw the union-security clause, disclaimed repre-
sentation of the bargaining unit during the existing term of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement.5" The Board waived the contract-bar rule
and ordered an election, which resulted in the certification of a new
union." The Board then ordered the employer to bargain with the new
union and petitioned the Ninth Circuit for enforcement, which was
granted.55
In enforcing the order, the court noted that the Board's decisions
in American Sunroof and Circle A & W rejected the employer's con-
tract-bar arguments "without explicitly recognizing the important pol-
icy to protect the employer by preserving the stability of a collective
bargaining agreement." ' In fact, the destabilizing effect of the new ex-
ception-when taken in conjunction with the American Seating rule
allowing the successor union to renegotiate the contract-may be signif-
icant.57 Employee and union attempts to circumvent an otherwise valid
4 Id. at 1129.
50 243 N.L.R.B. at 1130 n.6.
51 Id. at 1129-30 (footnotes omitted).
52 647 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 600 (1981).
3 Id. at 925.
84Id.
SId.
Id. at 926. As in American Sunroof, a strong dissent argued the importance of actual
balancing by the Board of the statutory interests. Id. at 927 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
57 The possibilities are alarming, considering the number of deauthorization elections held
every year. In 'fiscal year 1978, there were 140 such elections, with 89, or 63.6% resulting in
deauthorization. 43 NLRB ANN. REP. app. at 265, table 12 (1978). In fiscal year 1977, there
were 142 deauthorization elections, with 81, or 57%, resulting in deauthorization. 42 NLRB ANN.
REP. app. at 293, table 12 (1977).
1982]
464 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 131:457
contract by a deauthorization petition and subsequent disclaimer are, at
the least, made more likely by the Board's decision to suspend the con-
tract-bar rule whenever a union disclaims. Although the Circle A & W
court intimated that a union disclaimer, to be valid, must be more than
merely an attempt to avoid the contract,58 employees might well rid
themselves of a contract they dislike by simply eliminating the union-
shop agreement. Under those circumstances, many unions would not
continue as representatives because they would not be able to collect
dues. Such a scenario would threaten industrial stability because
all collective-bargaining agreements [would] become con-
tracts terminable at will. Disgruntled or dissatisfied employ-
ees will at any time be able to escape the terms of their con-
tract and force their employer to renegotiate employment
conditions by persuading their current representative to sim-
ply disclaim interest in representing them . . . . The pre-
dictability and stability in labor relations, supplied by mu-
tual and binding commitments contained in collective-
bargaining agreements and by our contract-bar principles,
will be frustrated by a lingering, if not persistent, threat that
one party will walk away from those commitments. 9
II. ENFORCING THE CONTRACT WHEN THE CONTRACT-BAR
RULE IS SUSPENDED
This Comment proposes that the Board should enforce the existing
contract when it certifies a new representative under an exception to
the contract-bar rule. This approach would result in the fairest balance
between the two competing statutory interests: the employees' free
choice, and economic stability. The Board's present rule60 erroneously
assumes that the right to bargain for a new contract follows automati-
cally from a change in representative, ignoring valid considerations that
militate against such a result.61
" The majority opinion emphasized that the employer did not allege that the employees or
the union were motivated by a desire to avoid the contract. 647 F.2d at 926-27.
' American Sunroof, 243 N.L.R.B. at 1131 (Pennello, dissenting) (footnote omitted).
60 See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
61 The NLRA provides no basis for the argument that a new union has a right to negotiate
its own contract and thereby avoid the existing contract. Section 1, which states the policies and
purposes of the Act, speaks only in terms of employee rights, not union rights. Indeed, the entire
Act speaks only in terms of safeguarding employee rights. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976). Any
right of the union to negotiate a new contract, then, flows from the rights of the employees.
CONTRACT-BAR RULE
A. Justifications for Suspending the Contract-Bar Rule
Employees may attempt to avoid the contract-bar rule and elect a
new collective bargaining representative for a number of reasons. 62 For
example, employees may be dissatisfied with the current contract, and
therefore rebel against the union that negotiated it. If the contract is so
deficient as to fail to meet a prerequisite to application of the contract-
bar rule,"3 the Board will allow an election. In such a case, the Ameri-
can Seating rule" allowing renegotiation of the contract by the succes-
sor union applies. The contract itself is the potential cause of industrial
instability: renegotiation is the only solution.
Generally, however, the Board does not permit an election and
renegotiation merely because of dissatisfaction with the terms of a valid
contract. The Act does not guarantee a "good" contract, and the Board
may not control the substantive terms of the agreement.6 5 In this situa-
tion, then, considerations of industrial stability outweigh those of em-
ployee free choice.
A second, and legitimate, reason workers might want to change
their union affiliation is dissatisfaction with the administration of the
contract. The Board allows a change in representation if the union's
administration is so inadequate as to render the union defunct.66 In
addition, a union's internal political and structural problems may pre-
vent its effective administration of the contract and justify an election.
At various periods, unions have had problems with rival federations,6 7
communist infiltration," and corruption. 9 A union may also simply
disclaim any interest in continued administration of the contract. In this
situation, too, the Board now allows an election to be held.70 In all
these cases, the American Seating rule applies automatically to allow
the successor union to negotiate a new contract.
These exceptions to the contract-bar rule, however, are unrelated
to any defect in the terms of the contract. Rather, they are justified by
62 The employees might decide against union representation entirely. The Supreme Court
has held, however, that employees continue to have enforceable contract rights which, as individu-
als, they may sue to protect under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 185 (1976). Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
63 See supra text accompanying notes 19-24.
" American Seating Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 250 (1953). See supra text accompanying notes 37-
41.
a' See NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 484-87 (1959); 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d) (1976).
"See supra notes 25 & 27-28 and accompanying text.
'7 The problem of rival federations was particularly acute in the 1930's and 1940's, forma-
tive years for the 0IO. See Summers, supra note 6, at 261 & n.1.
" See, e.g., id. at 261 & n.5.
61 See, e.g., id. at 262.
70 See American Sunroof Corp. -W. Coast, Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 1128 (1979).
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reference to some problem with the union-it has become defunct, is
involved in a "schism," or has disclaimed representation." Employees
are entitled to a change of representative in such situations because
their current union is not providing satisfactory representation as con-
templated by the Act.72 In a sense, the employer is on the outside of the
problem or dispute;73 any internal union problem or failure of the
union to act affects the employer's representational relationship with
the union, not the contractual relationship between the employer and
the employees.7 "4 Thus, in none of these situations is a renegotiation of
the contract justified.
A final exception to the contract-bar rule, the expanded bargaining
unit exception,75 presents a more complex situation. In some instances,
the expanded bargaining unit may render the contract so inadequate as
to jeopardize industrial stability; in these cases, renegotiation by the
successor union would be justified. In other cases, however, the problem
will be primarily one of contract administration, and the Board should
require adherence to the existing contract.76
B. Industrial Stability and Employee Free Choice
The Board's rule allowing renegotiation of the contract when an
exception to the contract-bar rule applies does not accord sufficient
weight to considerations of industrial stability. Both the employer 7 and
the public at large have a strong interest in such stability, which is
71 It has been suggested that employees who are dissatisfied with a valid contract can circum-
vent the contract-bar rule through the disclaimer exception, by persuading their union to disclaim
interest in representing them. See supra text accompanying note 59. Thus, the arguments in favor
of continuing the existing contract are particularly strong in this situation.
72 See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
73 Of course, an employer may have several interests that are implicated: its business may be
interrupted, at least slightly, by a union's on-going organizational drive; it may wish to implement
new terms or conditions of employment, but, because of uncertainty as to its duty to bargain, be
unable to do so until after the problem is solved; it may have an interest in seeing one particular
union retained or selected as representative; or it may prefer to deal with no union at all. All of
the employer's interests, however, are peripheral to the central problem: failure of the union to
function adequately.
7' This point is made clear by the duty-of-fair-representation cases, which held that union
failure to act does not leave the employer free to ignore the contract. See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor
Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 569-70 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 197 (1967); see
infra notes 97-106 and accompanying text.
75 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
76 A detailed consideration of the expanded bargaining unit exception is beyond the scope of
this Comment.
77 This assumes that most employers will prefer to continue the existing contract for its term
rather than to negotiate a new contract. In some instances, however, an employer will gladly
bargain for a new and less burdensome contract. In those cases, the employees, possessing a
favorable agreement, probably become the parties who wish to continue the contract. The same
considerations of industrial stability would be applicable, however, and the contract should there-
fore be continued.
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clearly promoted by a rule limiting the frequency of contract
negotiations.
From the employer's standpoint, contract negotiations are disrup-
tive. During negotiations (especially when a new union has been
elected), the operation of the business can be greatly affected: the em-
ployer must concentrate on the negotiations instead of the business; em-
ployees' concentration on their work may be reduced by concern about
the outcome of the .negotiatiQns; and the threat of a strike or lockout
looms throughout the effort to reach a settlement.7 8 The employer thus
has a strong incentive to negotiate a contract extending for several
years. Congress explicitly recognized this concern during its formula-
tion of the Taft-Hartley Act:
7 '
The chief advantage which an employer can reasonably
expect from a collective labor agreement is assurance of un-
interrupted operation during the term of the agreement.
Without some effective method of assuring freedom from ec-
onomic warfare for the term of the agreement, there is little
reason why an employer would desire to sign such a
contract. 80
The public also has an interest in industrial stability. Strikes affect
the public's access to goods and services. Inefficient operation of an em-
ployer's business, caused by the distractions of contract negotiations,
may redound 'to "th public's-d~triment in the form of increased prices
for products. Industrial instability may cause the economy to fluctuate
considerably, by way of sudden decreases in output because of strikes,
or quick and drastic changes in salary structure.8"
Against the employer's and the public's interest in industrial sta-
bility, there must be balanced the employees' interest in free choice. But
as noted earlier, the employees' concern in these situations is with the
administration of the agreement, not with its terms.82 Indeed, the con-
tract-bar rule comes into effect only when the agreement is otherwise
78 See NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490-91 (1960) (use of eco-
nomic weapons in support of a party's negotiating positions is not necessarily "inconsistent with
the duty of bargaining in good faith").
79 Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 171-197
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
" S. REP. NO. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1947).
"l The economic impact of large increases in salaries was an important concern when 1300
nurses went on strike in San Jose, Cal., in early 1982 in support of higher wages. The nurses
wanted pay comparable to equally trained professionals in male-dominated professions (e.g., phar-
macists). See San Jose Nurse Strike at Two More Hospitals, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1982, § 1, at
22, ol. 6.
" See supra text accompanying notes 25-34 & 71-74.
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valid;"3 but for the disability of the union, the contract would bar any
election and be enforceable for its reasonable term. Once the Board
certifies a new representative, then, the problem that justified the ex-
ception to the contract-bar rule, lack of contract administration, is
solved. At that point, interests of industrial stability should outweigh
the already exercised freedom of choice of the employees, and the ex-
isting contract should be enforced.
The Board's justification for not holding the existing agreement in
force is that the new union needs an opportunity to prove itself to the
employees at the negotiating table.8" The Board reasons that the repre-
sentative will thus be able to be "responsive to the needs and desires of
[its] constituents,"8' and employees will have an opportunity to evaluate
their choice of representative.8" Such an argument, however, underrates
the importance of the union's role as contract administrator. The Su-
preme Court has recognized a distinction between the union as negotia-
tor and the union as administrator, asserting that once a collective bar-
gaining contract is in place, the union's primary function is
administration of that contract.87 The union's task of administering the
contract will thus provide it with sufficient opportunity to prove itself.
Indeed, employee dissatisfaction with the previous union's contract ad-
ministration is what justifies a change of representative under an excep-
tion to the contract-bar rule. Thus, the new union's role can and should
be limited to contract administration, which can be of vital concern to
union members.
C. Other Accepted Limitations on Employee
Freedom of Choice
The proposal to continue the existing contract when the new rep-
resentative is chosen is subject to the criticism that it limits employee
freedom of choice. Employee free choice is, however, not without limits
under the Act.8 8
The contract-bar rule itself, despite its exceptions, normally limits
"free choice" for a three-year period. Further, the Act forbids, without
" See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
8 See supra text accompanying note 40.
American Seating Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 250, 255 (1953).
"Id.
87 The Supreme Court affirmed the distinction in its duty-of-fair-representation cases. See,
e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 194 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338-43
(1953) (discussing the bargaining duties of the union); ef Summers, The Individual Employee's
Rights Under the Collective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Representation? 126 U. PA. L.
REV. 251, 254 n.14 (1977) (discussing the difference between contract negotiation and contract
administration).
"See Freidin, supra note 6, at 92-93.
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exception, an election proceeding within twelve months of a preceding
valid election. 9 Similarly, when no contract exists, the Board normally
bars an election for one "year from the date of certification and requires
the employer to continue to bargain with the union for that year, de-
spite change in employee sentiment towards their representative.9"
Another instance in which employee freedom of choice is circum-
scribed involves the bargaining order. When the Board determines that
an employer unfair labor practice during a union's organizational drive
has reduced the probability of a fair election, it will order the employer
to bargain with the union based on valid authorization cards signed by
a majority of the employees.9 The Board does not require the union to
show that it has been able to maintain its majority status since the
authorization cards were signed.92 Thus, because of the likelihood of a
tainted outcome, the employees are deprived of an election and pre-
vented from changing representatives for at least a year.93
Admittedly, the purpose of the bargaining order is to preserve free
choice, not industrial stability. The bargaining order nonetheless limits
free choice, however, because the employees are not given the opportu-
nity to make their choice in an actual election. A signed authorization
card does not obligate an employee to vote for the union. Any legitimate
change of heart by the employees between the time they signed the
cards and the time an election would have been otherwise held goes
unrecognized (for at least a year) when a bargaining order issues.
Limitations on employee freedom of choice are also imposed in the
context of multi-employer bargaining. The union and the employer
make the decision to bargain on a multi-employer basis after the union
has already been elected.9 ' Once the multi-employer unit is established,
a rival union can replace the incumbent only by mustering majority
89 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1976). Senator Taft provided insight into the reason for this rule,
indicating that the provision was adopted "so that there shall not be a constant stirring up of
excitement by continual elections." 93 CONG. REC. 3838 (1947).
90 Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954). Industrial stability is again the justification for this
rule. Id. at 99-100. With a contract extending only for the length of the certification year, the
usual exceptions to the contract-bar rule, see supra notes 25-34 & 49 and accompanying text, will
apply. See Seger, The Majority Status of Incumbent Bargaining Representatives, 47 TUL. L. REV.
961, 967-78 (1973).
01 See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). See generally R. GORMAN, supra
note 14, at 94-95.
92 Cf NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969) (discussing imposition of bargain-
ing order without inquiry into majority status in "exceptional" cases). See generally Celanese
Corp. of Am., 95 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951) (employer ceases to recognize current union and commits
unfair labor practices; employer claims of loss of majority status disallowed).
"3 See generally Walther & Douglas, NLRB Bargaining Orders: A Problem-Solving or Ivory
Tower Approach to Labor Law?, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1977); Note, Bargaining Orders Without
Election Interference, 52 N.C.L. REV. 1303 (1974).
" See Comment, Employer Withdrawal from Multi-Employer Bargaining Units: A Propo-
sal for Self-Regulation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 689, 696-98 (1982).
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support in the entire multi-employer unit.95 Thus, the employees in a
single plant within a multi-employer unit-who never actually chose to
join the unit in the first place-'may be unable to change unions at the
end of a contract.
Thus, even if requiring a successor union to assume the contract
would restrict employee free choice, such a restriction would not be
unprecedented. When the Board or the courts have limited employee
free choice in other areas, they have found other interests to outweigh
it. The interest of industrial stability, as affirmed by Congress in the
twelve-month election bar of section 9(c)(3) of the Act,"' is one to be
accorded substantial weight. In the context of exceptions to the con-
tract-bar rule, it justifies requiring assumption of the existing contract.
D. Contractual Obligations
The Board's policy of disregarding the existing contract whenever
a new union is certified under a contract-bar-rule exception overlooks
yet another important consideration: satisfaction of contractual obliga-
tions. Supreme Court precedent and considerations of industrial stabil-
ity indicate that such obligations should be deemed to survive the disap-
pearance of the union that negotiated the agreement.
In Smith v. Evening News Association,9" the Court held that indi-
vidual employees can sue on the contract under section 301 of the La-
bor Management Relations Act.9 8 Because only parties to a contract
can sue for its breach,9 the holding, supported by later Supreme Court
cases,100 leads to the conclusion that employees are in a position similar
to that of parties to the contract.10 1 Under ordinary contract law princi-
ples, therefore, employees should be bound by the contract even after
95 Id. at 694.
29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1976).
'7 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
Labor Management Relations Act, § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
k Although third-party beneficiaries may sue on their own behalf when the party to the
contract is unable to do so, the Court in Smith determined that the employee's right to sue is
sufficient on its own, and therefore allowed the employee to sue despite the fact that the union
could also sue. 371 U.S. at 200. Thus, the employee is not a third-party beneficiary.
100 See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171 (1967).
101 In Smith, the Court noted that
[t]he concept that all suits to vindicate individual employee rights arising from a
collective bargaining contract should be excluded from coverage of § 301 has...
not survived. The rights of individual employees concerning rates of pay and condi-
tions of employment are a major focus of the negotiation and administration of
collective bargaining contracts. Individual claims lie at the heart of the grievance
and arbitration machinery . ...
371 U.S. at 200. The Court concluded that these "considerations foreclose respondent's reading of
§ 301 to exclude all suits brought by employees instead of unions." Id. at 200.
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they have voted out the union that negotiated it.
A collective bargaining agreement is, of course, not an ordinary
contract. It is generally governed by "ordinary principles of contract
law . . . adjusted in light of the imperatives of federal labor policy as
principally found in the Labor Act." ' 2 A section 301 action, in partic-
ular, is governed by federal common law.1 3
Federal common law also indicates that the employees and the em-
ployer remain bound by the contract after the union has gone from the
scene. The Supreme Court commonly binds the employer to the collec-
tive agreement despite difficulties between the employees and the union
representing them. Thus, the Court held in Vaca v. Sipes'" that when
the union breaches its duty of fair representation, the employer may not
use the union's breach as a defense to its own breach of the employ-
ment contract.1 5 The employer's contractual obligations to its employ-
ees are thus independent of the union's obligation.
It follows from Vaca that when the union that negotiated the con-
tract ceases representing the employees, the employer should remain
bound by the contract. Conversely, the employees, whose interests are
also bound up in the agreement, should likewise be bound'by it. Con-
trary to the Board's rule, a change in unions should thus have little
effect on obligations under the contract,0 6 for employer or employees.
The logical consequence of the Board's approach is a situation of
extreme uncertainty. If the certification of a new union is deemed to
relieve employees of their contractual obligations, 07 then the employer
should likewise be released from such constraints. Without a contract,
the employer is free to change terms and conditions of employment,
and, until a new contract is signed, both parties are without a grievance
procedure or no-strike clause to prevent economic warfare.'08 This situ-
ation not only subjects employers to a potential increase in economic
warfare, a result the contract is intended to avoid,' 0 9 but employees
may find employment conditions, such as wages, adjusted for the worse.
The more reasonable solution, in light of the statutory interest of indus-
trial stability, is to continue the existing contract.
101 R. GORMAN, supra note 14, at 549; see also John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376
U.S. 543, 550-51 (1964).
'03 See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
1- 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
105 Id. at 197.
106 This is especially clear when one realizes that the union has no statutory right to a new
contract-the Act speaks only of the rights of the employees.
107 See American Seating Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 250 (1953); see also supra notes 35-41 and
accompanying text.
'" See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
10, See S. REP. No. 105, supra note 80, at 16.
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E. Equitable Considerations
The Board's rule allowing a successor union to demand renegoti-
ation of the contract may put the employer at a significant disadvantage
vis A vis the union. The union, for example, may be able to ensure that
a succcessor employer will be bound by the existing contract. The
union can seek to accomplish this by incorporating into the contract a
duty of the present employer to require, in the event of the sale of the
business, any successor employer to assume the existing agreement.11
Under the Board's rule, however, the employer is unable to ensure the
continuance of the contract by any successor union. In effect, the Board
has inequitably restricted the employer's sphere of bargaining, while
not doing the same for the employees and their representative.
The Board's rule also gives short shrift to employer expectations.
The duration of the collective bargaining agreement is generally one of
the terms agreed upon during the negotiations for the original contract;
the employer may well have given up one of its demands in exchange
for a longer contract. The employer thus has acted in reliance on the
expectation that the contract will be in effect for the full, negotiated
period, subject only to the three-year "reasonable period" limitation."'
Under the Board's rule, the contract may not be given effect for this
length of time, and the employer may find its expectations frus-
trated-for reasons having little to do with its behavior, but rather
caused by either internal union problems or a changing bargaining
unit.
Furthermore, abandoning the Board's rule would not impose any
inequity upon the union or the employees. They would be bound by
the contract only for what the Board has already determined to be a
510 The union may have difficulty enforcing this contract provision against the successor em-
ployer. See Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974)
(contract with clause binding successor does not prevent successor empldyer from hiring its own
workforce); see also NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972) (successor em-
ployer who retained majority of existing employees not bound by existing contract). But see John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964) (when predecessor employer has disap-
peared through merger with successor employer, union can compel successor to arbitrate extent to
which successor is bound by existing contract). The union may, however, proceed through a law-
suit for damages against the selling employer, or for an injunction barring the sale. See Howard
Johnson, 417 U.S. at 258 & n.3 (because selling employers "continue as viable entities with sub-
stantial retained assets," union can obtain remedy against them through arbitration); National
Maritime Union v. Commerce Tankers Corp., 325 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), vacated, 457
F.2d 1127 (2d Cir. 1972).
The successor-employer situation is beyond the scope of this Comment. It should be noted,
however, that the successor employer's claim to be released from the contract appears to be
stronger than such a claim raised by employees. The employees, unlike the successor employer, are
in a position similar to that of parties to the contract. See supra text accompanying notes 97-106.
. See supra note 10.
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reasonable length of time, three years."' Indeed, the Supreme Court
has recognized that employee freedom of choice may be restricted, as
long as the restriction extends only for a reasonable, limited period of
time. s
Moreover, other sections of the NLRA are designed to ensure that
the contract originally bargained for is the fairest possible. For exam-




thereby ensuring, subject to remedy through an unfair labor practicce
proceeding, that the parties will have reached accord through reasona-
ble proposals and a sincere effort to negotiate an agreement.1 5 Indeed,
the Act as a whole was designed to ensure employees the opportunity
for a fair and reasonable collective bargaining agreement, given the em-
ployer's generally greater bargaining power." Therefore, when the
Board finds an exception to the contract-bar rule, the existing contract,
negotiated and completed within the confines of the Act,11 7 nevertheless
fulfills the Act's intent of establishing industrial stability. The employ-
ees, then, would not be justified in claiming that the terms of the ex-
isting contract are contrary to the policy of the Act. 1 "
F. Practical Considerations
To change the Board's present rule would entail few practical
problems. The practicability of an opposite rule is indicated by the fact
that in the case of a "schism," the new union normally accepts and
continues the existing contract.2 9
Difficulties are minimal for several reasons. Many contract provi-
sions, such as the grievance-arbitration clause, are fairly uniform
among different collective agreements, and the new union therefore
could easily continue them. Likewise, in the recognition clause, the new
union need only substitute its name for that of the old union. 2 A
... See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
'" See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 613 (1969). A bargaining order issued
pursuant to Gissel limits employee freedom of choice for at most one year, rather than the three-
year limit imposed under the contract-bar rule.
124 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
15 See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
2ie See § 1 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976); see also NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l
Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
"' See Container Corp. of Am., 61 N.L.R.B. 823, 826 & n.5 (1945).
118 If the union has not fairly represented the employees' rights during contract negotiations,
so that the employees do not have a fair contract, their complaint would properly allege a breach
of the union's duty of fair representation.
119 See Summers, supra note 6, at 278 & n.78.
10 The old union presents no threat, because once a union is decertified, all rights accorded
it under the contract cease. See Modine Mfg. Co. v. Grand Leaf Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 216
F.2d 326, 329 (6th Cir. 1954).
19821
474 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 131:457
union security clause tied to the previous union and its interests could
be eliminated,121 and the Board could allow the new union to negotiate
on its own behalf for a replacement provision.
The new union could replace the old in contract provisions for
pension and welfare funds, but taking over these provisions would raise
the problem of who controls the funds collected by the old union on
behalf of the employees. This issue could arise, however, whenever em-
ployees vote in a new union, and it can be settled by negotiations be-
tween the two unions or through litigation.
III. CONCLUSION
In its contract-bar rule, the Board has attempted to reach a bal-
ance between the competing concerns of industrial stability and em-
ployee free choice in collective bargaining representatives that underlie
the NLRA. But its decision not to enforce the existing contract when it
certifies a new union under an exception to the contract-bar rule fails
to accord fair weight to the concern of stability. In such situations, the
contract itself continues to be a stabilizing force; it is only the union's
administration of the contract that threatens industrial stability. More-
over, federal common law indicates that employees and employers re-
main bound by the contract even after a change in unions. Allowing
renegotiation is neither logical nor fair.
Enforcing the existing contract would promote stability without
unduly infringing upon employee free choice. Once employees have ex-
ercised their free choice in selecting a new bargaining representative,
the problem that justified the exception to the contract-bar rule-a defi-
ciency in union administration of the contract-has been solved. Em-
ployees will have the opportunity to exercise their free choice regarding
the contract at the end of the usual contract-bar period; this is a limita-
tion on free choice that the Board has already determined to be reason-
able, in light of the countervailing consideration of stability. Indeed, the
adoption of this Comment's proposed rule might well lead to even
greater freedom of choice for employees. With the existing contract con-
tinuing in effect as a stabilizing force, the Board might be willing to
waive the contract-bar rule and allow a change in unions more often.
... A deauthorization petition under § 9(e)(1) of the Act takes away the union-security
clause (because the union's authority is "rescinded"), but the contract continues. See supra note
47.
